Renewable Energy Federalism in Russia : Regions as New Actors for the Promotion of Clean Energy by Boute, Anatole
  1 
RENEWABLE ENERGY FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA: REGIONS AS NEW 
ACTORS FOR THE PROMOTION OF CLEAN ENERGY 
 
Anatole Boute

 
 
Published in Journal of Environmental Law (2013), published online May 30, 2013 
at: http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/05/30/jel.eqt005.abstract  
 
Abstract  
 
Russia is not only rich in natural gas, oil, coal and uranium. It also holds a 
considerable renewable energy resource base. The Federal Electricity Law mandates 
the federal Government to stimulate the development of renewable energy sources. 
However, so far, the Government has failed to create a functioning regulatory 
framework that would ensure the financial viability of these investments. This article 
examines the role that regional authorities could play in developing clean energy in 
the Russian Federation. Building further upon the environmental federalism literature, 
this article analyses the regulatory barriers to regional feed-in tariffs in Russia and, 
based on the US experience, proposes legal solutions to overcome these barriers. 
Russia – because of its role as a fossil fuel superpower, its weak track record on 
climate change mitigation, together with high political centralisation of power – is a 
unique case for an analysis of the role of regions as innovators of sustainable 
development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Russian Federation holds a considerable renewable energy resource base.
1
 
However, developing this potential is a controversial issue for domestic policymakers, 
especially because of a tradition of comparatively low energy prices, Russia’s position 
as fossil fuel superpower and its careful approach to climate change mitigation.
2
 Since 
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2
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November 2007, the Federal Electricity Law No. 35-FZ
3
 mandates the Government of 
the Russian Federation to promote the development of renewable energy sources. In 
2009, the Government adopted a national renewable energy target of 4.5 per cent of 
electricity consumption in 2020.
4
 However, the Government has so far failed to create 
a regulatory framework that would ensure the financial viability of renewable energy 
investments. In the absence of a functioning renewable energy support scheme, 
Russia runs the risk of missing the boat of the Green Revolution and lagging 
significantly behind developed countries and other BRIC economies
5
 in the field of 
the clean technology industry.  
 
This article analyses the role that regional authorities could play in developing 
Russia’s renewable energy potential. Faced with regulatory paralysis at federal 
government level, regions of the Russian Federation have started to implement their 
own renewable energy policies. The promotion of renewable energy sources could be 
a way for regions to stimulate local employment, innovation and secure electricity 
supply, particularly for regions that are dependent on energy imports.
6
 Electricity 
production from renewable energy sources could also be a way for regions to address 
the increasing environmental and economic challenges posed by waste from the 
forestry, agriculture and animal industries.
7
 To ensure the financial viability of 
renewable energy investments (and in order to level the playing field with traditional 
modes of electricity production), some regional authorities have sought to establish 
regulated prices for the electricity produced from renewable energy sources (RES-E).
8
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 Federal’nyi Zakon ‘Ob elektroenergetike’, with subsequent amendments, No. 35-FZ, signed 26 March 
2003, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (31 March 2003) No. 13 item 1177 
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4
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7
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istochniki energii’, No. 233-pp, signed 6 July 2009 (hereinafter the ‘Resolution of the Government of 
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po gosudarstvennomu regulirovaniiu tsen i tarifov v Belgorodskoi oblasti ‘Ob ustanovlenii tarifov na 
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istochnikov energii kvalifitsirovannom generiruiushchem ob’’ekte OAO PMTETS ‘Belyi Ruchei’ i 
priobretaemuiu v tseliakh kompensatsii poter’ v elektricheskikh setiakh’, No. 490, signed 22 October 
2012 (hereinafter ‘Order of the Vologda Tariff Authority Adopting the Tariff for the Electricity 
Produced from Renewable Energy Sources by the Belyi Ruchei Installation’); Postanovlenie 
gosudarstvennogo komiteta Respubliki Kareliia po tsenam i tarifam ‘O gosudarstvennom regulirovanii 
tarifov na elektricheskuiu energiu, proizvodimuiu maloi gidroelektrostantsiei ‘Liaskelia’ zakrytogo 
aktsionernogo obshchestva ‘Nord Gidro’’, No. 258, signed 12 December 2012 (hereinafter ‘Order of 
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However, regional RES-E tariffs in Russia face important regulatory and political 
obstacles from the federal government.
9
 In particular, federal authorities exercise 
control over electricity tariffs and the qualification (i.e. certification) of renewable 
energy installations. The objective of this paper is to analyse the regulatory and 
political barriers to regional renewable energy tariffs in Russia and to propose ways to 
overcome these barriers so as to enable the development of regional renewable energy 
policies in the absence of federal support. 
 
The structure of the argument proceeds as follows. The second section of this paper 
starts with a conceptual analysis of the legitimacy of regional renewable energy 
policies in Russia – an issue of particular importance given the centralised nature of 
the regulation of Russia’s electricity sector. Based on the general ‘environmental 
federalism’ literature, which examines the division of powers in the field of 
environmental protection, this section aims to assess the effectiveness of a regional as 
opposed to a federal approach to the support of renewable energy.  This analysis aims 
to explain the current lack of support for an ambitious federal renewable energy 
policy in Russia. It proposes possible reasons that might explain higher regional 
interest in renewable energy. From a law and economics perspective, this analysis is 
necessary to appreciate the importance of guaranteeing to regional authorities 
sufficient scope to implement renewable energy policies within federal regulatory 
boundaries.  
 
Section three of this paper analyses the division of powers in respect of the support of 
RES-E in Russia by looking at the Russian Constitution and the Federal Electricity 
Law. The paper also looks at the regulation of renewable energy under the Federal 
Energy Efficiency Law No. 261-FZ of 23 November 2009.
10
 The objective of this 
analysis is to understand the legal framework governing regional RES-E tariffs in 
Russia: is there a legal basis for regional RES-E tariff initiatives? The focus is on 
regional powers to guarantee the purchase of RES-E at regulated prices for a long-
term period.
11
 Regional subsidies are excluded from this analysis.
12
 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Karelian Tariff Authority Adopting the Tariff for the Electricity Produced by the Small 
Hydropower Plant Liaskelia’); Postanovlenie Komiteta gosudarstvennogo tsen i tarifov chukotskogo 
avtonomnogo okruga ‘Ob ustanovlenii tarifa na elektricheskuyu energiyu (moshchnost’), 
proizvodimuyu vetrovymi elektrostantsiiami, s ispol’zovaniem kotorykh osushchestvliaetsia 
proizvodstvo i postavka elektricheskoi energii (moshchnosti) na roznichnom rynke chukotskogo 
avtonomnogo okruga’, No. 6-e/Z, signed 15 June 2011 (hereinafter the ‘Decree of the Energy Tariff 
Commission of the Chukotka Autonomous Administration Adopting a Tariff for the Electricity 
Produced from Wind Turbines’). 
9
 For an analysis of these barriers, see Tsentr Infrastrukturnykh Issledovanii, Itogovyi Otchet 
Konsul’tanta po Proektu ‘Analiz Zakonodatel’stva o Vozobnovliaemykh Istochnikakh Energii v 
Kaluzhskoi Oblasti’ (Report for the IFC Russia Renewable Energy Programme, 2012). 
10
 Federal’nyi Zakon ‘Ob energosberezhenii i o povyshenii energeticheskoi effektivnosti’ with 
subsequent amendments, No. 261-FZ, signed 23 November 2009, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (30 November 2009) No. 48 item 5711 (hereinafter the ‘Federal Energy 
Efficiency Law’). 
11
 This article does not discuss the isolated and regulated (non-price) zones of the Russian electricity 
system. On the regulation of the Russian electricity market, see Anatole Boute, ‘The Russian 
Electricity Market Reform: Towards the Re-regulation of the Liberalised Market?’ in Fereidoon 
Sioshansi (ed.), Evolution of Global Electricity Markets: New Paradigms, New Challenges, New 
Approaches (Elsevier, 2013, forthcoming). 
12
 See Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF ‘Ob utverzhdenii Pravil predostavleniia subsidii iz federal’nogo 
biudzheta biudzhetam sub’’ektov RF na realizatsiiu regional’nykh programm v oblasti 
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Section four examines the regulatory barriers that could affect regional RES-E tariffs, 
in particular federal control over tariff setting in the electricity sector and federal 
qualification of renewable energy installations. Section five makes recommendations 
to overcome these obstacles. These recommendations are developed on the basis of a 
comparative law analysis with the US. This paper aims to build on the regulatory 
constructions that states in the US have developed to overcome federal obstacles to 
RES-E tariffs. Comparison with the US is relevant as it has a relatively similar 
constitutional division of powers to Russia and, more importantly, US states face 
comparable federal challenges to their RES-E tariff initiatives. Although inspired by 
the US, the recommendations put forward in this paper take into consideration the fact 
that Russia, in contrast to the US, still needs to complete its “first-generation” 
reforms, e.g. strengthen the rule of law, ensure the independency of its judicial 
system, guarantee the enforcement of contractual rights, limit corruption.
13
 In order to 
avoid the trap of an unsuccessful ‘legal transplant’,14 the recommendations of this 
paper are anchored in the very specific regulatory regime governing the Russian 
energy sector. More specifically, this paper looks at how regions in Russia could 
replicate the US approach based on their broader powers under the Russia’s Federal 
Energy Efficiency Law. 
 
An analysis of the role of regions for the promotion of clean energy in Russia is not 
only relevant to develop new mechanisms to unlock Russia’s huge renewable energy 
potential in the absence of federal support. A study of Russia also makes a valuable 
contribution to the environmental federalism debate in general. Indeed, Russia – 
because of its role as a fossil fuel superpower, its weak track record on climate change 
mitigation, together with its high political centralisation of power – is a unique case 
for an analysis of the role of regions as innovators of sustainable development. 
 
2. The Concept of Renewable Energy Federalism and its Application to Russia 
 
The determination of the appropriate level of government to promote renewable 
energy sources in federal states has been the subject of an intense debate in the 
political economy and law and economics literature, in particular in the United 
States
15
 but also in Canada
16
 and Australia.
17
 Similarly, in the European Union, a 
                                                                                                                                                              
energosberezheniia i povysheniia energeticheskoi effektivnosti, No. 746, signed 5 September 2011 
Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (12 September 2011) No. 37 item 5258 
(hereinafter the ‘Government Decree on Regional Energy Efficiency Subsidies). See also Tsentr 
Infrastrukturnykh Issledovanii (n 9) 59 ff. 
13
 Rudiger Ahrend and William Tompson, ‘Fifteen Years of Economic Reform in Russia: What has 
been Achieved? What Remains to be Done?’, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Economics Department Working Paper No.430 (2005), 
<http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:430-en> accessed 3 January 2013. 
14
 See e.g. David Nelken, ‘The Meaning of Success in Transnational Legal Transfers’ (2001) 19 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 349. 
15
 See e.g. Kirsten Engel, ‘Why Not a Regional Approach to State Renewable Power Mandates?’ 
(2011-2012) 3 San Diego J of Climate & Energy L 79; Benjamin Sovacool, ‘The Best of Both Worlds: 
Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate 
Change’ (2008) 27 Stanford Environmental LJ 397; Jim Rossi, ‘The Shaky Political Economy 
Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement’ (2011) U Ill L Rev 361. 
16
 See e.g. See e.g. Scott Victor Valentine, ‘Canada’s Constitutional Separation of (Wind) Power’ 
(2010) 38 Energy Policy 1918. 
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lively debate centred around the harmonisation of national renewable energy support 
schemes: is it more efficient to support renewable energy sources in a decentralised 
way at the level of the individual member states or will a common EU approach 
generate efficiency gains?
18
 Based on the environmental federalism literature, 
scholars generally agree that the following criteria need to be taken into account to 
evaluate the efficiency of a regional (decentralised) versus a federal (centralised) 
approach to the promotion of renewable energy: (1) the geographical scope of the 
policy objectives pursued (i.e. global climate change mitigation or local 
environmental protection); (2) the diverging renewable energy resource base; (3) the 
role of regional authorities as innovators; and (4) incentives for a ‘race to the top’ 
between regions.  
 
2.1. Efficiency in Addressing Global v. Local Environmental Protection 
 
In accordance with the political economy and law and economics literature on 
environmental federalism, the appropriate level of government to address 
environmental problems depends on ‘the geographic scope of the externalities in 
question’.19 One of the key objectives of renewable energy policies is to contribute to 
climate change mitigation. Given the global nature of climate change, a centralised 
approach appears to ‘better match the geographic scope of the problem at hand than 
do state or local approaches.’20  
 
In Russia, climate change is far from a priority on the political agenda.
21
 While Russia 
has ratified the Kyoto Protocol
22
 and become the largest issuer of Emission Reduction 
Units under the Joint Implementation mechanism, Russia has so far refused to adhere 
to the second commitment period of the Protocol.
23
 Russia has adopted a Climate 
                                                                                                                                                              
17
 See e.g. Stephen Jones, ‘The Future of Renewable Energy in Australia: A Test for Cooperative 
Federalism’ (2009) 68 The Australian J of Public Administration 1. 
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 See e.g. Commission, ‘The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources – Accompanying 
Document to the Proposal for a Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable 
Sources’ (Commission Staff Working Document) SEC (2008) 57, 15; Commission, ‘The Support of 
Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources’ (Communication) COM (2005) 627 final, 16-17; Council 
of European Energy Regulators, Implications of Non-harmonised Renewable Support Schemes – A 
CEER Conclusions Paper (2012), <www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSULT
ATIONS/ELECTRICITY/Non%20harmonised%20RES> accessed 3 January 2013. 
19
 David Spence, ‘Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production’ 
(2012) University of Texas School of Law – Law and Economics Research Paper No. 222, 21 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017280> accessed 3 January 2013.  
20
 For an overview and criticism of the arguments underlying this claim, see Rossi, (n 15) 361. See also 
Engel, ‘Why Not a Regional Approach to State Renewable Power Mandates?’ (n 15) 83; Jared Snyder 
and Jonathan Binder, ‘The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the 
States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change’ (2009) 27 UCLA J Envtl L & Pol’y 231, 234. 
21
 Anna Korppoo and Adnan Vatansever, A Climate Vision for Russia: From Rhetoric to Action, 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012) 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/RussiaClimate.pdf> accessed 3 January 2013.  
22
 Federal’nyi Zakon ‘O ratifikatsii Kiotskogo protokola k Ramochnoi konventsii Organizatsii 
Ob‘edinennykh Natsii ob izmenenii klimata’ with subsequent amendments, No. 128-FZ, signed 4 
November 2004, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (08 November 2004) No. 
45 item 4378 (hereinafter the ‘Federal Law on the Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change’). 
23
 Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on 
its seventh session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, Decision 1/CMP.7, 
Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
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Doctrine, and has announced that it aims to reduce emissions by 25 per cent (as 
compared with 1990 levels) by 2020.
24
 Renewable energy sources are part of that 
Russian climate strategy. In practice, however, the contribution of renewable energy 
to the decarbonisation of energy supply is unlikely to be a sufficient reason to justify 
action in this field. The contribution of renewable energy to global environmental 
protection and the effectiveness of a federal approach to achieve this objective is thus 
not the most relevant criterion to assess renewable energy federalism in Russia. 
 
The economic and local environmental benefits of renewable energy are more 
important elements for the development of renewable energy in Russia. Different 
regions of the Russian Federation (e.g. Belgorod, Archangelsk, Kaluga)
25
 face 
considerable challenges with respect to the management of waste, in particular from 
forestry, agriculture and the animal industry. Renewable energy policies can be a way 
for these regions to address this waste problem.
26
 Simultaneously, this policy could 
stimulate local employment (e.g. maintenance and operation of the generating 
facilities),
27
 innovation and new industrial developments.
28
 It could also favourably 
influence the security of energy supply in regional electricity systems, by modernising 
the energy infrastructure and improving the availability of energy sources for 
electricity production.
29
 This is an issue of particular importance in Russia for regions 
that are dependent on energy imports.
30
 In addition, these policies could stimulate the 
development of a regional renewable energy industry that could open new export 
opportunities. These local economic and environmental benefits are key reasons for 
states to support the use of renewable energy in regional energy systems.
31
  
 
However, it is important to note that, in Russia, the centralisation of power and 
limited exposure of regional leaders to electoral pressure reduce the relevance of 
                                                                                                                                                              
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 3 January 2013. 
24
 See Rasporiazhenie Prezidenta RF ‘O Klimaticheskoi doktrine Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ No. 861-r, 
signed 17 December 2009, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (21 December 
2009) No. 51 item 6305 (the ‘Resolution on the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation’).  
25
 On the potential for energy production based on biodegradable waste from the agro-industry in the 
Kaluga Oblast’, see CCGS (n 6) 8-9 and 42-58. 
26
 ibid. On the importance of waste (biomass) management for regional renewable energy policies in 
Europe, see e.g. Commission, ‘The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources’ (n 18) 15; 
Gemma Reece and Max Rathmann, Harmonisation and Coordination of European RES-E Support 
Mechanisms – Consequences from a National Viewpoint, (Ecofys, 2008) 3 <http://www.futures-
e.org/docs.php> accessed 3 January 2013.  
27
 See European Wind Energy Association, Green Growth – The Impact of Wind Energy on Jobs and 
the Economy (2012) <www.ewea.org/greengrowth> accessed 3 January 2013; Commission Staff 
Working Document SWD (2012) 164 final accompanying Commission, ‘Renewable energy: a major 
player in the European energy market’ (Communication) COM (2012) 271 final. 
28
 On the importance of economic benefits for regional renewable energy policies in Australia and 
Canada, see Jones (n 17) 10; IEA, Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada Review 2009 (2010) 90. 
29
 See Valery Minin, Economic Aspects of Small-Scale Renewable Energy Development in Remote 
Settlements of the Kola Peninsula, Bellona Report 2012, at 41, 
<http://www.bellona.org/reports/renewables-economy-kola> accessed 3 January 2013. 
30
 See e.g. the case of the Kaluga Oblast’ in CCGS (n 6) 38-39. 
31
 On the policy objectives underlying renewable energy support schemes in general, see Simon Müller, 
Adam Brown, and Samantha Ölz, Renewable Energy: Policy Considerations for Deploying 
Renewables (IEA, 2011) 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,20553,en.html. 
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social and political arguments to support the case of renewable energy.
32
 The risk of 
criticism from the Centre (e.g. because of the sensitivity of energy price increases) 
might dissuade regional authorities from independent implementation of renewable 
energy policies, even if these policies could contribute to the economic and social 
development of the regions concerned. Moreover, corruption and the protection of 
vested interests could be barriers to achieve the social and economic benefits 
associated with regional renewable energy policies in Russia. 
 
2.2. Economies of Scale v. “allocative inefficiency of centralised provision”33 
 
In the environmental federalism literature, an oft–cited advantage of the centralised 
approach to environmental protection relates to the economies of scale in regulation.
34
 
Proponents of centralisation highlight the benefits that uniform environmental rules 
provide to industry, particularly in terms of the reduction of transaction costs.
35
 On 
the other hand, advocates of a decentralised approach to environmental protection 
invoke the ‘allocative inefficiency of the centralised provision’.36  The causes and 
extent of environmental degradation, as well as the nature and cost of the remediation 
needed, vary greatly from state to state and therefore justify state-level regulation.
37
  
 
Similar considerations are relevant in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of 
centralised and decentralised support of renewable energy sources in Russia. On the 
one hand, a uniform support scheme at the federal level could, in theory, reduce 
transaction costs for investors. Moreover, a centralised approach presents the benefits 
of ‘“learning effects” that flow from deploying the technology to meet greater 
cumulative volume levels’.38 On the other hand, given Russia’s enormous territory, 
the physical potential for renewable energy and the economic power to support these 
investments varies greatly between the different regions of the Russian Federation.
39
 
Thus a decentralised policy would be better adapted to these local needs and could 
therefore be more efficient.
40
  
 
2.3. Investment Certainty v. Innovation and Flexibility 
                                                        
32
 The author is grateful to Arild Moe for his argument. On the centralisation of power in Russia, see 
e.g. Cameron Ross, ‘Federalism and Inter-government Relations in Russia’ (2010) 26 J Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics 165, 181. 
33
 Michael Faure and Jason Scott Johnston, ‘The Law and Economics of Environmental Federalism: 
Europe and the United States Compared’ (2008) University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for 
Law and Economic Research Paper No. 08-07, 29 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1098493> accessed 3 January 2013. 
34
 Ann Carlson, ‘Iterative Federalism and Climate Change’ (2009) 103 Nw U L Rev 1097, 1104; 
Garrick Pursley and Hannah Wiseman, ‘Local Energy’ 60 Emory L J 877, 939. 
35
 Sovacool (n 15) 421. See also Commission Staff Working Document) SEC (2008) 57, 15; 
Renewable Energy Systems Limited, Response to the Consultation on Electricity Market Reform 
(2011) <www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/emr/emr.aspx> accessed 3 January 2013. 
36
 On this concept and the relevant literature, see Faure and Johnston (n 33) 29. 
37
 Pursley and Wiseman (n 34) 936. 
38
 On this argument generally, see Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper, ‘Big is Beautiful: The 
Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard’ (2007) 20 The Electricity J 
48, 57. 
39
 On the potential for renewable energy in the regions of the Russian Federation, see Vladimir 
Nikolaev and others, Perspektivy razvitiia vozobnovliaemykh istochnikov energii v Rossii – Rezul’taty 
proekta TASIS (2009); Aleksander Starkov and others, Russian Wind Atlas (Russian–Danish Institute 
for Energy Efficiency, 2000). 
40
 On this argument in the US, see Pursley and Wiseman (n 34) 937.  
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Advocates of a centralised approach to environmental protection highlight the positive 
contribution of uniform rules to investment predictability and certainty. Under a 
centralised approach, ‘uniformity helps manufacturers and industry by providing a 
consistent and predictable statutory environment’.41 In defence of decentralisation, the 
literature refers to the contribution by regional authorities to innovation and agenda-
setting. Regions can serve as ‘laboratories’ to test different environmental policy 
instruments
42
 that are later used at federal level.
43
  
 
Investment certainty is, given the capital intensity and long term nature of clean 
energy investments, a key factor for the deployment of renewable energy sources.
44
 
From an investor’s perspective, ‘a financial change of the support system is 
considered the most important risk factor’ for investors in renewable energy since the 
level of support is the most important element influencing expected profit.
45
 In Russia 
this risk is exacerbated by the relative instability and unpredictability of the 
investment climate, together with the poor protection of property rights and 
inadequate enforcement of contracts.
46
 The paramount importance of regulatory 
certainty for renewable energy investments is, given the alleged benefit of uniformity 
and stability under centralised environmental policies, a strong argument in favour of 
federal-level support schemes for renewable energy.  
 
In Russia, however, the federal level of government has been reluctant to implement a 
functioning support scheme for renewable energy, mainly because of the impact that 
this policy could have on energy prices.
47
 The availability of relatively cheap fossil 
fuels in Russia reduces the interest of policymakers in the development of alternative 
modes of electricity production, given the cost of these investments in relation to the 
high political sensitivity of price increases in the energy sector. More importantly 
                                                        
41
 Kristen Engel, ‘State Environmental Standard-setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom?”’ 
(1997) 48 Hastings L J 271. 
42
 Sovacool (n 15) 430; Kirsten Engel, ‘Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law’ (2006) 56 Emory LJ 159, 182; Daniel Farber, ‘Climate Change, Federalism, and 
the Constitution’ (2008) 50 Arizona LR 879, 922; Alexandra Klass, ‘State Innovation and Preemption: 
Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts’ (2008) 41 Loy LALR 1653, 1707. 
43
 Sovacool (n 15) 431; Jonathan Adler, ‘Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
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from a perspective of investment certainty, the federal approach to the support of 
renewable energy has undergone substantial changes.
48
 The Federal Electricity Law, 
as amended in November 2007, established the basis for a ‘premium’ scheme – a 
regulated mark-up to the wholesale market price.
49
 In 2010, the Law was eventually 
amended to provide a legal basis for the support of renewable energy on the basis of 
long term regulated capacity agreements.
50
 That notwithstanding, in 2012, the 
Government still had to adopt key documents to ensure the functioning of this new 
capacity-based approach to the support of renewable energy.
51 
 
 
In the absence of action at the federal level, regional initiatives are necessary to 
innovate and test renewable energy support schemes and thereby influence the federal 
agenda. Several regions of the Russian Federation (e.g. Belgorod,
52
 Tomsk Oblast’,53 
Krasnodar,
54
 Amur Oblast’,55 Volvograd Oblast’56 and Chelyabinsk57) have adopted 
regional legislation to promote the development of renewable energy sources. 
Following the environmental federalism literature, these initiatives demonstrate the 
role that regions could play as ‘laboratories’ and sources of innovation.  
 
2.4. Race to the Bottom v. Race to the Top 
 
Renewable energy support policies – in a similar way to energy efficiency 
improvement policies – present both costs and benefits for the regional economy.58 
On the one hand, the deployment of renewable energy reduces local pollution and 
waste, creates employment, stimulates innovation and contributes to regional energy 
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52
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53
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 Zakon Krasnodarskogo Kraia ob ispol’zovanii vozobnovliaemykh istochnikov energii v 
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Amurskoi oblasti, No. 451-OZ, signed 14 March 2005. 
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energetiki, No. 10-r, signed 5 January 1995.  
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3 San Diego J Climate & Energy L 3, 46; Barry Rabe, ‘Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. 
State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2007) 7 Sustainable Development L and Policy 10; Engel, ‘State 
Environmental Standard-setting’ (n 41) 375. 
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security. These economic and environmental benefits present worthy reasons for 
states to compete with each other to attract capital and technology in the renewable 
energy sector, thereby stimulating a ‘race to the top’ in terms of the ambition of 
regional support policies.  
 
On the other hand, renewable energy policies impose a cost on energy end-users, an 
issue of particular political sensitivity in Russia. At least in the short-term, the 
additional public support necessary to finance the relatively high capital cost of 
investment in renewable energy will generate increased electricity prices. Moreover, 
because of their variable production patterns, the connection of wind and solar PV 
installations to the grid can result in additional network reinforcement and system 
balancing charges. This negative impact on the regional economy could act as 
deterrent to regional renewable energy support policies. In regions with a limited 
renewable energy resource base or abundance of fossil fuels, this economic impact is, 
in the short term, more likely to outweigh the benefits of renewable energy policies 
than in energy importing regions. In Russia, where the Unified Energy System 
transcends regional boundaries, unilateral renewable energy action by activist regions 
could, in the short term, increase electricity prices and thereby disadvantage local 
industrial and commercial costumers who might then be tempted to move to 
neighbouring states.
59
 However, this risk of industry relocation could be offset by the 
employment and innovation benefits of a local renewable energy industry, as well as 
by the positive contribution that the deployment of renewable energy sources can 
have on regional energy security.  
 
2.5. Renewable Energy Federalism in Russia: the Key Role of Regions 
 
An analysis of renewable energy in Russia, in the light of the environmental 
federalism literature, raises doubts regarding the current feasibility and short-term 
effectiveness of federal support to develop clean energy. Arguments usually invoked 
in favour of a centralised approach to environmental protection are weak when it 
comes to the promotion of renewable energy in Russia. First, climate change is not a 
high political priority; federal support for renewable energy can thus not easily be 
justified on the basis of its effectiveness to achieve global emission reductions. In 
addition, the argument that a centralised approach to environmental protection leads 
to improved investment certainty and reduced transaction costs is less obvious in 
Russia. The federal government has introduced substantial changes to its renewable 
energy policy (from a premium to a capacity-based scheme) and, given the political 
sensitivity of price increases, has been reluctant to implement a functioning support 
scheme. 
 
In contrast, action at regional level appears, at least for the time being, to present 
higher efficiency gains for the promotion of clean energy in Russia. Given the very 
diverse renewable energy resource bases found in the different regions of the Russian 
Federation, regional authorities might be better equipped to develop support 
mechanisms that are best adapted to their specific conditions. Regional action to 
support renewable energy could also be more efficient because of the local 
environmental and economic benefits of this policy, particularly with regard to the 
                                                        
59
 Robert McKinstry and Thomas Peterson, ‘The Implications of the New “Old” Federalism in Climate-
Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take the Lead’ (2007) 20 
Pac McGeorge Glbal Bus & Dev LJ 61, 64. 
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solution that it provides for the treatment of waste and opportunities in terms of 
employment, innovation, security of supply and modernisation of the energy 
infrastructure. Taking these local benefits into account, regions could act as 
‘laboratories’ or ‘regulatory safety nets’60 waiting for federal action. Innovation with 
renewable energy policies at regional level could ultimately help overcome federal 
quasi-paralysis in this field. There is however a risk that, given the centralisation of 
power in Russia, regions might be reluctant to promote renewable energy sources if 
such initiatives face the risk of criticism by the federal authorities. 
 
In this context, it is ‘paramount that states [regions] are given relatively free reign to 
develop policy solutions’61 within the boundaries of federal law. The risk of federal 
rules ‘closing the door to the policy-making efforts of other levels of government’62 
should be avoided. A crucial question is thus whether, in Russia, the federal 
framework governing the electricity sector and renewable energy provides regions 
with sufficient scope to implement ambitious renewable energy policies. In particular, 
do regions have the regulatory power to provide long term regulated tariff guarantees 
to stimulate investment in electricity production from renewable energy sources?  
 
3. Regional Powers for the Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources in Russia 
 
To determine whether regions in Russia have sufficient regulatory powers to promote 
renewable energy, it is necessary to look at the constitutional division of powers 
between regions and the federal level of government, before examining how 
renewable energy and electricity tariffs are regulated in the Russian Federal 
Electricity Law and the Federal Energy Efficiency Law. 
 
3.1. Constitutional Division of Powers 
 
The Russian Constitution
63
 establishes the federal nature of Russia’s state system. The 
Russian Federation consists of 21 Republics, nine ‘Krais’, 47 ‘Oblasts’, four 
autonomous ‘Okrugs’, and two cities of federal importance (Moscow and St 
Petersburg).
64
 These ‘subjects’ of the Russian Federation exercise state authority 
within the limits of the constitutional division of powers between the federal and 
regional (subject) levels of government.
65
 As a general rule, regional authorities 
benefit from residual powers,
66
 i.e. they have the competence to regulate on all issues 
that have not been allocated to the federal level of government or to both the federal 
and the regional authorities (the so-called ‘shared competences’).67 When exercising 
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 ibid. 
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subsequent amendments. 
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65
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issledovanie (Iurkompani, 2010), at 119, accessed via Konsul’tantPlius on 1 September 2012.  
66
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mestnoe samoupravlenie 1, accessed via Konsul’tantPlius on 1 September 2012.  
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 Russian Constitution, art 73. 
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‘shared competences’, regional authorities can regulate certain activities up until the 
federal level decides to intervene (pre-empt). If a region has acted in the absence of 
federal regulation, it will have to put its regional law into conformity with federal law. 
 
It is important to note that, according to Article 4 of the Russian Constitution, the 
Constitution and federal laws are the supreme law of the Russian Federation. In 
accordance with Article 1 of Federal Law 184-FZ on the General Principles for the 
Organisation of the Legislative and Executive Organs of the Subjects of the Russian 
Federation,
68
 federal laws prevail in any case of conflict with regional acts.
69
 
 
The following competences are of relevance for renewable energy. In accordance with 
Article 71 of the Russian Constitution, the federal authorities have the exclusive 
competence to regulate the federal energy systems and nuclear energy.
70
 The federal 
authorities are also in charge with the regulation of the internal (single) market, i.e. 
the exchange of goods within the Russian Federation. Moreover, they hold the power 
to determine federal policy on economic development and environmental protection. 
Furthermore, Article 72 of the Constitution establishes shared federal-regional 
competences for the regulation of environmental protection and ecological security.  
 
These competences can be interpreted in a broad way
71
 and accordingly provide 
extensive powers to the federal government.
72
 This is essentially what has happened 
in recent years
73
 and has led to the centralisation of powers in the Russian 
Federation,
74
 including tariff and electricity regulation,
75
 with important consequences 
for the ability of regional authorities to pursue independent renewable energy policies. 
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3.2. Federal Regulation of the Electricity Sector 
 
The electricity sector is a particularly illustrative example of the centralisation of 
powers at the federal level. The Russian electricity system  – the Unified Energy 
System of the Russian Federation – is the world’s fourth largest electricity system. It 
covers a vast region that extends from Russia’s borders with the European Union to 
the Pacific Ocean. To maintain the unity of the system, Russian electricity regulation 
is based on a unified (all-Russia) approach.
76
 The Federal Electricity Law ‘pre-empts’ 
regulation in the electricity sector. In accordance with Article 4 of the Law, regional 
authorities cannot adopt legislation affecting the electricity sector unless explicitly 
permitted to do so by federal law. As will be discussed in the next sub-section, an 
essential competence that the Federal Electricity Law delegates to regional authorities 
is the power to adopt tariffs for the RES-E that network companies purchase to 
compensate the losses on their network. Moreover, regions could act based on the 
broader powers conferred by the Federal Energy Efficiency Law. Indeed, as will be 
discussed below, this Law includes renewable energy within the concept of energy 
efficiency. It mandates regions to impose energy efficiency (e.g. renewable energy) 
obligations on network companies and gives regions the power to adopt tariffs that 
facilitate energy savings, e.g. through the use of renewable energy. 
 
3.3. Renewable Energy under the Federal Electricity Law 
 
The Federal Electricity Law
77
 charges the Government of the Russian Federation with 
the task of determining national policy on renewable energy. The Law does not limit 
this task to the determination of renewable energy policy at the federal level. The task 
therefore implicitly extends to cover the determination of regional renewable energy 
policy. Federal regulation of renewable energy sources, including the promotion of 
renewable energy in regions of the Russian Federation, finds constitutional support in 
Article 72 of the Russian Constitution that establishes shared powers for 
environmental protection.  
 
According to the Federal Electricity Law, a key aspect of the national renewable 
energy policy is the determination of strategic targets and measures (including, in 
particular, support schemes) to achieve these targets. To monitor the achievement of 
these strategic targets, the Law establishes a system of qualification (i.e. certification) 
of renewable energy generating facilities. The Federal Electricity Law charges the 
regulator of the wholesale market, the Market Council, with the task of managing this 
process of qualification.
78
 Qualification is a cornerstone of Russian renewable energy 
law: support based on the Federal Electricity Law is limited to ‘qualified’ 
installations. 
 
As mentioned above, in January 2009, the Government of the Russian Federation has 
adopted a 4.5 per cent target of electricity consumption and production from 
renewable energy sources to be achieved by 2020. Moreover, the Government has 
adopted different programs of measures, outlining how it intends to achieve this 
                                                                                                                                                              
75
 See Gel’man (n 73) 17. 
76
 See arts 4 and 6 of the Federal Electricity Law. 
77
 art 21, para 1. 
78
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target.
79
 These programs have rarely been implemented and have not led to a 
functioning support scheme for renewable energy. They thereby raise serious doubts 
as to whether the 4.5 per cent target can be achieved by 2020 and as to whether it 
should be postponed to 2030. 
 
Nonetheless, the Federal Electricity Law mandates the Government to support the use 
of renewable energy. The Law establishes the basis for a ‘premium’ scheme (mark-up 
in addition to the wholesale market price). In 2010, a new approach to the support of 
renewable energy was included in the Federal Electricity Law: the Law now provides 
a legal basis for the support of renewable energy through the capacity market. The 
capacity-based support scheme did not formally replace the premium scheme. In 
practice, however, it seems increasingly clear, that the premium scheme is unlikely to 
see the light of day with all focus now being on the development of the capacity-
based scheme. 
 
With the premium and capacity-based schemes, the Federal Electricity Law integrates 
support for renewable energy into the wholesale market. It is logical for a federal law 
to follow this approach since the wholesale market is the trading platform which 
brings together market players of federal importance – in particular, large electricity 
producers (with an installed capacity exceeding 5 MW) and large consumers. The 
Federal Electricity Law requires the Government of the Russian Federation to develop 
the necessary regulatory framework to implement these support schemes in practice. 
Although the Government of the Russian Federation has adopted different legislation 
that outlines how parts of these support schemes would function, important parts of 
the regulatory framework are still missing. Investors still have no idea of the level and 
duration of support that these renewable energy installations will receive. In the 
absence of the necessary implementing legislation, federal support through the 
wholesale market is impossible. Continuous delays and postponements in the 
implementation of a functioning support scheme highlight the political sensitivity of 
renewable energy at the federal level of government in Russia. The Government has 
invoked technical and legal obstacles to justify the delay in the implementation of the 
support scheme.
80
 More importantly, renewable energy in Russia faces opposition 
because of the short-term impact that this policy can have on electricity prices.
81
  
 
The Federal Electricity Law does not limit support for renewable energy to federal 
mechanisms on the wholesale market. It also establishes a legal basis for support on 
the retail market, i.e. for renewable energy generating facilities with an installed 
capacity under 25 MW. In particular, the Law establishes an obligation for network 
companies to compensate losses on their network as a priority by purchasing RES-
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E.
82
 On the retail market, regional tariff authorities (Regional Energy Commissions) 
can regulate the price at which network companies purchase RES-E to compensate 
their losses.
83
 By basing support on regulated prices and imposing a purchase 
obligation on network companies, this scheme resembles ‘feed-in tariffs’.84 In Russia, 
the competence to adapt RES-E tariffs is one of the rare powers that the Federal 
Electricity Law delegates to regional authorities. However, as will be shown in detail 
below, the implementation of this regional scheme faces not insignificant regulatory 
barriers at federal level.  
 
3.4. Constitutional Status of Regional Tariff Authorities 
 
Regional tariff authorities play a central role in regional renewable energy policies, 
since they are responsible to determine the price at which network companies 
purchase RES-E. It is therefore important to examine the structure of these authorities 
and, in particular, the extent to which these entities are dependent on the federal 
government.  
 
Article 77 of the Russian Constitution charges regional authorities with the task of 
independently establishing the structure of the regional administration. However, 
those authorities must respect the general principles for the organisation of the 
executive branch of government, which are set out in federal laws. This administrative 
structure results from the principle of the unified system of administration across the 
Russian Federation.
85
 In accordance with the Federal Law on the General Principles 
for the Organisation of the Legislative and Executive Organs of the Regions of the 
Russian Federation, tariff regulation is one of the competences shared between the 
federal and regional levels of government. The federal authorities, based on their right 
of pre-emption of shared powers, have made use of this competence: the Federal 
Electricity Law and the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 
1178 on Electricity Retail Tariffs
86
 govern the activities of the tariff authorities in the 
Russian electricity sector. Moreover, the administrative functioning of regional tariff 
authorities is regulated by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on 
the Regulation of the Regional Tariff Authorities.
87
 This governmental Decree 
determines the main tasks and powers of the regional tariff authorities and regulates 
the procedure for the formation of tariffs. This federal regulatory framework thus 
limits the margin for manoeuvre of regional tariff authorities.  
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In accordance with this regulatory framework, the Federal Service for Tariffs (FST) is 
the highest tariff authority in the Russian Federation.
88
 It is charged with the 
development of methodologies that govern the regulation of tariffs at regional level. 
In the electricity sector, regional tariff authorities regulate prices on the basis of Order 
20-e/2 of the FST.
89
 Moreover, the FST adopts limits (minimum and maximum 
prices) within which regional tariffs must remain.  
 
Importantly for present purposes, the Government Decree on the Regulation of 
Regional Tariff Authorities allows regional authorities to adopt RES-E tariffs. More 
generally, this Decree provides that one of the main tasks of regional tariff authorities 
is to create economic incentives to stimulate energy efficiency improvements in the 
electricity sector, including, as will be discussed in the next sub-section, the use of 
renewable energy sources.
90
 Regional tariff authorities thus have a clear mandate to 
adopt tariffs that provide economic stimulus to develop renewable energy. However, 
these tariffs must remain within the limits established by the FST.  
 
3.5. Renewable Energy as part of the Russian Energy Efficiency Strategy 
 
The Federal Energy Efficiency Law includes renewable energy in the Russian energy 
efficiency strategy:
91
 the deployment of renewable energy is one of the energy 
efficiency improvement measures that regions should consider for inclusion in 
regional energy efficiency programs – the programs that outline how regions intend to 
improve the energy efficiency of the regional economy.
92
 Moreover, the energy 
efficiency targets that regions must adopt in accordance with the Federal Energy 
Efficiency Law should reflect the deployment of renewable energy sources.
93
 The 
Federal Energy Efficiency Law thus provides additional legal support for regional 
action to promote the use of renewable energy.
94
 This legal basis is an important 
means of overcoming the federal obstacles that currently inhibit regional RES-E tariff 
initiatives under the Federal Electricity Law. 
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 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ‘Ob utverzhdenii polozheniia o Federal’noi Sluzhbe 
po Tarifam’, with subsequent amendments, No. 332, signed 30 June 2004, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (15 July 2004) No. 29 item 3049 (hereinafter the ‘Government 
Resolution on the Federal Service for Tariffs’). 
89
 Prikaz FST RF ‘Ob utverzhdenii metodicheskikh ukazanii po raschetu reguliruemykh tarifov i tsen 
na elektricheskuiu (teplovuiu) energiiu na roznichnom (potrebitel’skom) rynke’, with subsequent 
amendments, No. 20-e/2, signed 6 August 2004, Rossiiskaia gazeta (2 November 2004) No. 242 
(hereinafter ‘Order of the FST 20-e/2 on Tariff Methodologies in the Electricity Retail Market’).  
90
 The Government Decree on Regional Tariff Authorities, item 3, d. 
91
 See IFC, Financing Renewable Energy Investments in Russia: Legal Challenges and Opportunities 
(2012) 15, 
<www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/europe+middle+east+and+north+africa
/ifc+in+europe+and+central+asia/publications/financing+renewable+energy+investments+in+russia+-
+legal+challenges+and+opportunities> accessed 3 January 2013. 
92
 See also Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ‘O trebovaniiakh k regional’nym I 
munitsipal’nym programmam v oblasti energosberezheniia I povysheniia energeticheskoi 
effektivnosti’, No. 1225, signed 31 December 2009, with subsequent amendments, Sobranie 
Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RF) (8 February 2010) No. 6 item 645 (hereinafter the 
‘Government Decree On Requirements for the Regional and Municipal Energy Efficiency Programs’). 
93
 Federal Energy Efficiency Law, art 14, para 5.  
94
 Vladimir Popondopulo, Oleg Gorodov and Dmitrii Petrov, ‘Vozobnovliaemye Istochniki Energii v 
Elektroenergetike, (2011) Energeticheskoe Pravo, at 4 (access through Konsul’tantPlius on 10 January 
2013).  
  17 
4. Federal Barriers to Regional Renewable Energy Tariff Policies 
 
Initiatives by regional authorities to guarantee the purchase of RES-E at regulated 
prices face obstacles which stem from the division of powers in the electricity sector 
between the federal and regional levels of government. Regional RES-E tariffs can be 
blocked by federal control over electricity prices and by federal refusal to qualify 
renewable energy installations. In the absence of a functioning support scheme at 
national level, these federal obstacles to regional policies could hinder, and even 
paralyse, the development of renewable energy in Russia. From a clean energy 
perspective, an analysis of these obstacles and ways to overcome them is therefore 
essential to understand the scope that regional authorities have to stimulate the use of 
alternative energy sources in their electricity system. 
 
4.1. Qualification of Renewable Energy Installations 
 
The Federal Electricity Law limits the support of renewable energy in Russia to 
generating facilities that have been ‘qualified’ as ‘renewable energy’ installations. 
Qualification takes place in accordance with the procedure established by Decree of 
the Government of the Russian Federation No. 426 of 3 June 2008 on the 
Qualification of a Production Installation Using Renewable Energy Sources.
95
 As 
outlined above, the qualification of electricity generating facilities as ‘renewable 
energy installations’ is a federal competence delegated to the Market Council, the 
regulator of the wholesale market.
96
 Regional tariff authorities can thus only adopt 
RES-E tariffs following qualification by the Market Council of the renewable energy 
installations to which these tariffs will apply. 
 
In accordance with Decree 426 on the Qualification of Renewable Energy 
Installations, renewable energy projects can only be qualified after their construction 
and connection to the network. Because of this ex post facto qualification procedure, 
investors have no guarantee that they will be able to benefit from RES-E tariffs when 
they make their investment decisions.
97
 Given that regional tariff authorities cannot 
adopt RES-E tariffs in the absence of qualification, investors have no certainty about 
the tariff level that will apply to their projects, which exposes them to considerable 
investment unpredictability.
98
  
 
The risk that the inaction or refusal of federal authorities (i.e. the Market Council) 
represents for regional RES tariff policies is illustrated by the Decision of the 
Arbitration Court of the Vologda Oblast’, 99  which was upheld on appeal to the 
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Federal Arbitration Court of the North-West Circuit,
100
 in a challenge against the 
validity of RES-E retail tariffs for a facility producing electricity and heat from wood 
waste. The courts, both at first instance and on appeal, held that the regional tariff 
authority contradicted the Federal Electricity Law because it adopted a RES-E tariff 
without qualification of the generating facility concerned in accordance with the 
appropriate procedure. The court accordingly declared the regional RES-E tariff 
invalid. 
 
4.2. Tariff Methodologies 
 
As examined above, tariff regulation is a competence shared between the federal and 
regional levels of government.
101
 Regional authorities accordingly have the right to 
adopt tariffs without the need for a specific mandate under federal law. However, 
following the principle of supremacy of federal law, regional tariffs must comply with 
the federal regulation on tariffs. The Federal Electricity Law
102
 regulates the 
distribution of competences for tariff regulation between the federal and regional level 
of government: regional authorities must adopt tariffs on the basis of federal tariff 
principles.
103
 The Russian Government has laid out these principles in Decree No. 
1178 on Electricity Retail Tariffs. The Federal Service for Tariffs has, on the basis of 
these principles, elaborated tariff methodologies in its Order 20-e/2. 
 
With specific reference to renewable energy, Decree No. 1178 on Electricity Retail 
Tariff confirms that regional tariff authorities must adopt tariffs for the compensation 
of losses with RES-E following the methodologies determined by the FST. The 
Government has explicitly mandated the FST with the task of developing specific 
methodologies for RES retail tariffs.
104
 The FST has not yet adopted these 
methodologies. The question is therefore whether, in the absence of federal 
methodologies, regional authorities can independently act and adopt RES retail tariffs 
on the basis of existing (non RES-specific) methodologies.  
 
It is arguable that making use of existing federal tariff methodologies does not 
contradict the requirement of Decree No. 1178 on Electricity Retail Tariffs. Indeed, 
this Decree does not explicitly require the adoption of specific renewable energy tariff 
methodologies. It only states that renewable energy tariffs must be determined on the 
basis of federal methodologies.  
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Order 20-e/2 of the FST (and Russian tariff regulation in general)
105
 is based on the 
principle of the ‘economic well-founded nature of costs’. Following this principle, 
investors must demonstrate that their investment and operating costs are justified, 
such as on the basis of accounting reports, statistical data and / or independent expert 
evaluations.
106
 Regional authorities could, in the absence of specific RES tariff 
methodologies, base their tariff decisions on an assessment of the economically well-
founded nature of the costs of the RES investments concerned. In this respect, the 
relatively higher capital costs of RES investments in relation to thermal power plants 
could be a challenge. This challenge is, however, not insurmountable. Indeed, the 
Federal Arbitrazh Court of the North-West District recently recognised that the 
additional costs related to the transformation and supply of biomass for combined 
electricity and heat production were, in that case, ‘economically well-founded.’107  
 
Nevertheless, from an investor’s perspective, the possible adoption of federal RES 
tariff methodologies by the FST represents a not insignificant risk and could be 
considered as a critical source of investment uncertainty.
108
 Given the political 
concern surrounding the cost of renewable energy, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the FST or the Ministry of Energy might decide to cap the capital costs and return 
on investments of RES projects, thereby jeopardising the business case made on the 
basis of previous regional RES tariff decisions and on which existing investments 
were made.
109
  
 
4.3. Federal Tariff Limits 
 
The price that network companies charge in order to compensate their losses is one of 
the parameters that regulatory authorities must take into account when determining 
transmission/network tariffs.
110
 The value of this parameter (i.e. the prices/tariffs at 
which the electricity to compensate the losses will be purchased) is calculated before 
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every year of the regulated period. On a yearly basis, the tariff authorities adapt the 
tariffs with the aim, among others, of reflecting the evolution of prices for the 
purchase of electricity in order to compensate network losses.
111
 These provisions 
seem to provide relatively solid guarantees to network companies that they will be 
able to recover the higher costs related to the compensation of losses with RES-E.  
 
In practice, however, this recovery of costs will depend on whether the transmission 
tariffs remain within the limits of the FST determinations for the region.
112
 Indeed, an 
important constraint to regional RES-E tariff initiatives is that, according to the 
Government Decree No. 1178 on Electricity Retail Tariffs,
113
 retail tariffs and 
network tariffs must remain within federal tariff limits. Federal limits for network 
tariffs could jeopardise the recovery by the network companies of the higher costs for 
the compensation of network losses with RES-E. 
 
4.4. Tariff Duration 
 
Decree No. 1178 on Electricity Retail Tariffs provides that RES-E tariffs are 
determined on a yearly basis.
114
 This short-term duration of tariffs is incompatible 
with the long-term investment certainty needed to recover the capital costs of 
renewable energy projects.
115
 In the EU, support mechanisms generally apply for a 
period of at least ten years. Tariff unpredictability increases the returns that investors 
require to invest in new technologies: it requires investors to add a ‘risk premium’ to 
their business case, thereby reducing the amount of projects that might be financially 
viable. The risk premium issue is particularly acute in Russia, given the relatively 
risky business environment and regulatory instability. 
 
4.5. Enforceable Priority Purchase of Renewable Energy at Regulated Prices? 
 
Article 32 of the Federal Electricity Law requires network companies to compensate 
network losses using, as a priority, RES-E. Article 23.1 of this Law provides that 
regulated tariffs apply to the RES-E that network companies purchase to compensate 
their losses. However, the Federal Electricity Law does not explicitly make the link 
between the obligation to purchase as a priority RES-E and the regulated tariffs.
116
 
The Law does not stipulate in the same article that network companies are obliged to 
compensate their losses as a priority with RES-E, which they must purchase at 
regulated prices. Moreover, the Law does not guarantee that renewable energy 
investors will be able to inject all the electricity they produce into the electricity 
network. In contrast to the common design of feed-in tariffs, the Law does not 
establish an obligation of priority access to the network. Although it makes logical 
sense to assume, on the basis of Articles 32 and 23.1 of the Federal Electricity Law, 
that network companies are obliged to purchase RES-E at regulated tariffs, the risk 
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exists that companies could seek to rely upon a different interpretation of those 
Articles in order to escape this obligation.
117
  
 
5. Overcoming the Federal Barriers 
 
Federal barriers to regional (state-level) RES-E tariff policies are not unique to the 
Russian Federation. In the US, for instance, the initiative by the State of California to 
guarantee the purchase of RES-E at regulated prices for a long-term period was 
challenged on the basis of its alleged incompatibility with the Federal Power Act and 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. Interestingly, federal challenges to state-
level RES-E tariff initiatives in the US are very similar to the federal obstacles to 
regional RES-E tariffs in Russia: broad federal control over the electricity price 
determination process and federal qualification of renewable energy generating 
facilities. Given comparable federal barriers to regional RES-E tariff policies in the 
US and Russia, state-level regulatory solutions to circumvent these obstacles in the 
US can provide interesting input for the design of solutions to overcome federal 
barriers in Russia. Although the specific electricity market regulation in the US and 
Russia greatly varies, both federal states share comparable constitutional principles 
that make a comparative approach feasible.  
 
5.1. State-level RES-E Tariffs in the US: Lessons to Overcome Federal Barriers in 
Russia 
 
In the US, in accordance with the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the rates and conditions of 
electricity sales in interstate (wholesale) commerce,
118
 a notion that, according to its 
broad interpretation,
119
 includes virtually all power purchase agreements that a utility 
concludes with other producers.
120
 FERC approves the rates for all wholesale 
electricity sales by assessing, on a contract-by-contract basis, whether these rates are 
“just and reasonable” and do not unduly discriminate. 121  For renewable energy 
generating facilities, the question is whether prices exceeding market prices, 
necessary to recover the relatively higher investment costs of these projects, are not 
inherently unjust and unreasonable.
122
 In a similar way to the principle of the 
‘economic well-founded nature of costs’ in Russia, FERC adopts a cost-based 
approach in its assessment of electricity rates: rates are ‘just and reasonable’ if they 
allow recovery of prudent costs plus a reasonable return on investment.
123
 This 
approach does not necessarily exclude the higher costs of renewable energy 
investments, provided investors can demonstrate these costs were reasonably made. 
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However, FERC’s necessary review and approval of the costs on a contract-by-
contract basis considerably limits the regulatory role of states in this process. 
 
Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, states can require electricity utilities 
(suppliers) to purchase electricity produced by renewable energy installations at 
regulated prices. However, this right is also subject to stringent conditions and review 
by FERC. Only renewable energy installations that the FERC has approved as 
‘qualified facility’ are eligible for regulated tariffs.124 More importantly, state-level 
electricity tariffs for these installations cannot exceed the ‘avoided costs’ of the 
purchasing utility, i.e. the costs that the utility would have incurred if it would have 
produced the electricity itself or purchased it from another source.
125
 FERC has 
strictly interpreted the notion of ‘avoided costs’: avoided cost rates must reflect the 
cost of electricity production from ‘all sources able to sell’ to the purchasing utility.126 
Moreover, these rates must be based on ‘real costs’ that would ‘actually be incurred 
by the utility’. 127  Avoided cost rates may not compensate for environmental 
externalities
128
 that have not yet been internalised, but must be limited to pecuniary 
(‘real’) costs resulting from constraining environmental policies (e.g. emission 
reduction and renewable energy obligations).
129
  
 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act does not allow states to implement 
classical feed-in tariff schemes. Nevertheless, the Act, as interpreted by FERC, 
authorises states to adopt a creative approach to the definition of ‘avoided costs’ that 
could enable them to support the development of renewable energy. In the US, states, 
not the federal government, have the power to regulate the sources (fuel mix) for 
electricity production in their electricity systems.
130
 When determining the ‘sources 
able to sell to the utility’, states may take into account the obligations imposed on 
utilities to purchase a certain amount of electricity from renewable energy sources 
(e.g. by introducing so-called Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) requirements). 
According to FERC, ‘where a state requires a utility to procure a certain percentage of 
energy from generators with certain characteristics [e.g. RES-E], generators with 
those characteristics [renewable energy generating facilities] constitute sources that 
are relevant to the determination of the utility’s avoided cost for that procurement 
requirement.’131 In the absence of a federal feed-in tariff scheme in the US, states 
could therefore guarantee the purchase of RES-E at regulated prices provided such 
price guarantees are directly linked with quantity-based obligations (RPS).
132
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In the US, states are thus not free to design feed-in tariff schemes: FERC retains the 
exclusive right to assess and disapprove state-level tariffs. Past examples of rejection 
by FERC of state-level tariffs for alternative modes of electricity production
133
 
highlights that the risk of federal ‘intrusion’134 with regional clean energy policies is 
not merely hypothetical. However, by linking price-based guarantees (feed-in) to 
quantity-based (RPS) obligations, states can minimise the risk of federal invalidation 
of their renewable energy tariff policies. Could this scheme be replicated in Russia to 
overcome the federal obstacles that regions face regarding their RES-E tariff policies? 
 
5.2. Linking Price- and Quantity-based Schemes in the Regions of the Russian 
Federation 
 
As described above, in Russia, regional support for renewable energy is anchored in 
the retail market (i.e. for installations under 25 MW) and based on the priority 
purchase of RES-E by the network companies to compensate losses on their network. 
In accordance with the Federal Electricity Law, regional authorities can adopt specific 
tariffs for the electricity that network companies purchase from renewable energy 
generating facilities. However, federal control over these tariffs and over the 
qualification of RES installations, together with regulatory uncertainty concerning the 
obligation of network companies to purchase RES-E at regulated tariffs, reduces the 
effectiveness of this scheme. In the absence of regulatory amendments to address 
these obstacles, the question is if, following the US case, regions could impose 
quantity-based RES obligations on network companies and link these obligations to 
long-term price guarantees for RES investors. The necessary legislative basis for this 
approach should not be sought in the Federal Electricity Law, but in Russian energy 
efficiency law. 
 
The Federal Energy Efficiency Law mandates regional authorities to encourage 
network companies to improve the energy efficiency of their activities and reduce 
losses on their network.
135
 They can require companies that provide regulated services 
to implement certain energy saving measures.
136
 The investment programs of 
regulated companies (such as network companies) must include the energy efficiency 
requirements that the competent authorities determine for those companies.
137
 As 
described above, the Federal Energy Efficiency Law includes renewable energy under 
the concept of energy efficiency. Electricity production from renewable energy 
sources can be considered as an energy saving measure within the meaning of the 
Federal Energy Efficiency Law. On this basis, regional authorities could establish the 
compensation of network losses with RES-E as a requirement of the energy efficiency 
program of the network company and include these requirements in the investment 
programs of the network companies.
138
 The PPAs that the network companies would 
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sign with renewable energy investors would be then considered as an energy saving 
measure.  
 
Including the PPA with RES-E investors as an energy saving measure in the 
investment program of the network company has important consequences from a 
tariff perspective. Firstly, by introducing the obligation to compensate network losses 
with RES-E in the energy efficiency programs – and thus indirectly the investment 
programs – of network companies, regional authorities could circumvent the tariff 
limits set by the FST. Indeed, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article 23.1 of the 
Federal Electricity Law, regional tariff authorities can exceed federal tariff limits if 
this is necessary to implement the investment programs of the companies concerned. 
Secondly, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article 25 of the Federal Energy 
Efficiency Law, the tariffs of companies that provide regulated services should reflect 
the costs incurred to implement investment programs. By requiring the network 
company to compensate network losses with RES-E, the regional authorities would 
thus facilitate the recovery of
 
the costs related to the purchase of RES-E (i.e. the costs 
of the PPA with renewable energy investors). In addition, to facilitate the recovery of 
the costs of the PPA, and thus indirectly the (capital) costs of the RES investment 
concerned,  regional authorities could make use of the long term tariff guarantees of 
paragraph 6 of Article 25 of the Federal Energy Efficiency Law. According to this 
provision, to stimulate energy savings, tariffs must be determined on a long-term 
basis. The regional tariff authorities could therefore guarantee long-term parameters 
of tariff regulation in agreements with the network company.  
 
Importantly, by including the obligation to compensate network losses with RES-E in 
the energy efficiency and investment programs of network companies, regions can 
circumvent the federal qualification barrier. Indeed, the Federal Energy Efficiency 
Law does not make the inclusion of renewable energy measures in energy efficiency 
programs subject to any qualification requirement. Regions must respect the 
definition of renewable energy in the Federal Electricity Law. They are, however, free 
to adopt their own qualification procedure with respect to the implementation of 
regional energy efficiency policies.  
 
From an energy savings perspective, it must be noted that the compensation of 
network losses with RES-E must be considered in parallel with improvements of the 
network infrastructure to limit losses. It does not make sense to compensate losses 
with increased electricity production – even from renewable energy sources – if these 
losses could be avoided by energy efficiency improvements of the networks. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Despite its huge renewable energy potential, Russia lags far behind most other 
developed and emerging economies in the clean energy sector. The political 
sensitivity of price increases – necessary in the short term to ensure the financial 
viability of renewable energy investments – has so far blocked the implementation of 
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a federal support scheme. In this context, based on the environmental federalism 
literature, there are good reasons to believe that regional authorities can be more 
effective actors for the development of renewable energy sources in Russia. Indeed, 
regions have a more direct interest in the local economic and environmental benefits 
that renewable energy represents. Depending on their resource base and the costs 
associated with its development, regions could therefore more easily justify the 
necessary price increases. 
 
However, given the centralisation of power in Russia, particularly in the electricity 
sector and in respect of tariff regulation, regional renewable energy policy initiatives 
face not insignificant federal barriers. Federal control over tariffs and federal 
qualification of renewable energy installations present the risk of constraining 
regional RES-E tariff initiatives. In the absence of federal support, it is essential, from 
a sustainable energy perspective, that regions overcome these barriers in order to act 
as innovators in this field and to contribute to the modernisation of the Russian energy 
infrastructure.  
 
Broader regional powers under the Federal Energy Efficiency Law, together with the 
inclusion of renewable energy as part of the concept of energy efficiency, provide 
regions with the necessary legal basis to pursue an ambitious renewable energy 
program. Regions can, on this basis, impose on network companies the obligation to 
compensate their losses with RES-E and ensure recovery of the costs associated with 
this obligation through energy efficiency tariff guarantees. This combined quantity- 
and price-based approach to the support of renewable energy is inspired by the debate 
on state-level feed-in tariffs in the US. It could provide the regions of the Russian 
Federation with the necessary scope to act as ‘regulatory safety nets’, to start the 
development of renewable energy in Russia and possibly influence the 
implementation of a functioning federal scheme. 
